Our study has three objectives. The first is to determine the level of voluntary disclosure in Saudi Arabia. The second is to compare this level with that of some other Arab countries. The third is to identify the main drivers of voluntary disclosure in Saudi Arabia. We use a disclosure checklist of 54 items to measure levels of voluntary disclosure. We also use the ordinary least square (OLS) regression analysis to test our hypotheses for a sample of 361 firm-year observations of firms listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange over the period 2007-2011. We find that the average voluntary disclosure level is 18.38%. This rate is the lowest rate among the other Arab countries studied; the rates ranged from 26.08% in 
Introduction
In the business environment, companies are required to disclose minimum levels of information, which is known as mandatory disclosure; if not, they will face sanctions.
Therefore, almost all companies comply fully with the minimum levels of the mandatory disclosure (Hassan et al., 2009) . However, the current business era makes compliance with this mandatory disclosure neither adequate nor suitable to meet the corporate information users' needs. This raises an urgent need for extra information than is required; this extra information is known as the voluntary disclosure.
Businesses in the current era face information challenges that they never met in the past. First, the current age is the information age, in which information has become a crucial influencer. In other words, any piece of information may make a crucial change to the users' investment decisions; therefore, the present limited mandatory information is not sufficient. Second, the separation of the companies' ownership and management creates what is known as the information asymmetry problem. Traditionally, annual reports are used to minimize this information gap. Lev (1989) , Wallace (1988) , and Baker and Haslem (1973) , however, argue that financial statements do not provide users with adequate information, which increases the information gap between information suppliers (managers) and information demanders (stakeholders). In addition, nowadays, the nature and extent of information demanded are both different and greater than in the past, which means that information asymmetry is larger than in the past. Therefore, to mitigate this problem, companies need to voluntarily disclose more information. Third, recent decades have witnessed financial scandals resulting in the collapse of long-lived companies. We believe that one of the main reasons for these collapses is the concealing and nondisclosure of relevant information, although the failed companies have been found to comply completely with the minimum levels of mandatory disclosure. Consequently, the need for voluntary disclosure has increased.
In order to cope with the information challenges in the current business era, companies are encouraged by the regulating and accounting bodies, pressured by the stakeholders, and directed by the market, to disclose more information than is required. In addition, the regulating bodies have started to set regulations and provide guidelines to (Albassam, 2014) . Second, the economy of Saudi Arabia is a leading in the Arab region, where it represented 25% of the total Arab GDP and 44% of total Arab market capitalization in 2010 (Albassam, 2014; Alshehri & Solomon, 2012) . Further, Saudi Arabia holds one quarter of the world's oil reserves and is one of the largest oil producers in OPEC, about 31% of the total OPEC production in 2010 (Albassam, 2014) .
Third, the ownership structure in Saudi Arabia is family and state-concentrated, where family-owned firms represent more than 70% of listed firms and Saudi government owns more than 30% of listed firms (Albassam, 2014; Baydoun, et al. 2013; ROSC, 2009 ). All these aspects motivate us to examine the determinant s of voluntary disclosure in Saudi Arabia, an area that remains really under-researched.
Our analysis shows that the average voluntary disclosure level in Saudi Arabia is 18.38%. This is the lowest rate of the countries studied; these range from 26.08% in Tunisia to 75.76% in Bahrain. This lowest rate is not commensurate with the size of the Saudi Arabian size. Our analysis also shows that firm size, firm age, firm profitability, auditor specialization, family ownership, and industry type positively affect voluntary disclosure. We find, however, a negative relation between firm leverage and voluntary disclosure. Our analysis also shows that board independence, Big 4 and state ownership have no impact on voluntary disclosure.
To the best of our knowledge, only two studies examine the drivers of voluntary disclosure in Saudi Arabia; namely, Al-Janadi et al. (2013) and Alsaeed (2006) . Our paper makes major contributions to research on voluntary disclosure in Saudi Arabia as follows:
First, we use a recent and longer period (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) Second, Al-Janadi et al. (2013) investigate the corporate governance impact on voluntary disclosure, while Alsaeed (2006) examines the impact of firm characteristics on voluntary disclosure. Our study investigates the impact of both corporate governance mechanisms and firm characteristics on voluntary disclosure. Third, our study covers a larger number of firm-year observations (361), compared with 87 and 40 by other two studies. Finally, we use a comprehensive disclosure index consisting of 54 disclosure items; while the indices used in the two prior studies consist of only 20 and 21 disclosure items.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discussed the theoretical framework and relevant literature. Section 3 discusses the development of the hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the methodology. Section 5 discusses the findings. Section 6 concludes.
Theories and Literature Review

Theories explaining the voluntary disclosure variance
Disclosure studies show wide variances in nature and extent of voluntary disclosure across firms within the same industry and country. Some firms are found to voluntarily disclose large amounts of information, while others do not disclose any more. Accounting
Researchers around the world examine the potential determinants of disclosure extensively and provide many theories to explain the voluntary disclosure variance. These theories include agency theory; legitimacy theory; signaling theory; capital need theory and stakeholder theory.
Agency theory postulates that companies tend to disclose more information voluntarily in order to reduce the agency costs that arise from conflicts between managers and stockholders (Alves, 2012; Zayoud et al., 2011; Watson et al., 2002; Lambert, 2001) .
Legitimacy theory argues that firms have a social contract with society, and therefore, firms provide greater levels of voluntary disclosure in order to ensure that they comply with the ethics and regulations of that society, as mandatory disclosure may be insufficient (Bazine & Vural, 2011; Rizk, 2006; Guthrie et al., 2004) . Signaling theory proposes that firms with large levels of voluntary disclosure intend to reduce the information asymmetry and signal the quality and real value of firms by providing more information to parties who lack information (Bazine & Vural, 2011; Morris, 1987; Ross, 1977) . Capital need theory suggests that firms resort to disclosing more information voluntarily when they need to raise more funds whether from banks or financial markets (Meek et al. 1995; Hossain et al. 1994) . Stakeholders' theory assumes that firms should satisfy and meet the interests and the information needs of all stakeholders rather than only the shareholders (Abdel-Fattah, 2008 ). This theory expects also that large firms are more likely to provide more voluntary information because of the greater stress of large number of stakeholders. We use these theories in developing our research hypotheses.
The Literature Review
We review relevant literature that examines the voluntary disclosure in developing countries. Using the Egyptian context, Soliman (2013) examines the association between certain firm characteristics and the extent of voluntary disclosure. He finds that firm size and profitability are positively associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure, while auditor size and firm age do not have any significant association. Samaha and Dahawy (2011) find that the overall voluntary disclosure level by Egyptian firms was low (13.43%). They also find a positive association between the ratio of independent directors on the board, profitability and internationality and voluntary disclosure level. However, managerial and governmental ownerships, number of shareholders, auditor type, size, liquidity, leverage and industry type were found not to affect the voluntary disclosure level. Abdel-Fattah (2008) finds that that although the voluntary disclosure level found to be low, there was a gradual increase in the extent of total voluntary disclosure among Egyptian firms over the study years [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . Furthermore, the findings indicate that board size and board composition do affect the extent of voluntary disclosure. Hassan et al. (2006) find that the sample firms publish 90%, on average, of the mandatory disclosure checklist items and 48%, on average, of the voluntary disclosure checklist items prepared by authors. The results show also a general increase in the disclosure levels over the study period 1995-2002 . Moreover, public sector firms appear to disclose less information than private sector firms do. Further, firms that are more profitable found to disclose more information than less profitable firms did and large firms found to disclose more voluntary disclosure and less mandatory disclosure. Juhmani (2013) examines the association between three ownership structure variables and voluntary disclosure for a sample of 41 firms listed on Bahrain Stock Exchange in the year 2010. The results indicate a negative correlation between blockholder ownership and voluntary disclosure, but there was no correlation found between managerial or governmental ownership and voluntary disclosure. In addition, size and leverage were included as control variables, and were found to be positively correlated with voluntary disclosure. Kolsi (2012) finds that Tunisian firm leverage, audit quality, financial sector and profitability ratio are significant determinants of voluntary disclosure, while ownership structure and firm size have no effect on voluntary disclosure. Htay (2012) finds that Malaysian firms with higher board size, a higher proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board, and a lower proportion of directors' ownership voluntarily disclose more financial accounting information. The results indicate that firm age, size, complexity, and assets-in-place are significantly correlated with the voluntary disclosure index; however, the profitability variable was found to be insignificantly correlated. Aljifri (2008) examines annual reports of 31 UAE firms, for the year 2003. He finds significant differences among sectors, but finds insignificant correlation between size, debt-equity ratio, and profitability and voluntary disclosure. In addition, Barako (2007) Figure 1 categorizes the 30 variables that are studied in the disclosure literature as determinants of voluntary disclosure. We classify them into three main categories: board characteristics, corporate characteristics, and ownership structure.
Hypotheses Development
Firm Size
Alves et al. (2012) encounter political costs to a greater extent than small firms; therefore, large firms work to reduce political costs through disclosing more information voluntarily (Abdel-Fattah, 2008; Camfferman & Cooke, 2002; Watts & Zimmerman, 1990; Cooke, 1989) . Based on these arguments, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relation between firms' size and voluntary disclosure.
Firm Age
There is a debate as to the level of influence of firms' age on voluntary disclosure. Sehar et al. (2013) argue that new firms disclose more information voluntarily than do old ones. However, Hossain (2008) documents that it is not possible to conclude that the older firms disclose more information than do new firms. Furthermore, Owusu-Ansah (1998) argues that a considerable portion of the new firms' information is related to research and development, and expenditure; therefore, these firms can encounter a competitive disadvantage if they fail to disclose such information. In this regard, this study argues that new firms lack the financial resources and expertise to organize and disseminate more information than is required and these firms prioritize meeting the large set-up costs rather than incurring the additional costs of voluntary disclosure. In addition, new firms may encounter less pressure from stakeholders for voluntary disclosure compared to older ones.
Therefore, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relation between firms' age and voluntary disclosure.
Firm Profitability
The majority of disclosure studies propose a positive association between firm profitability and voluntary disclosure. Moreover, this proposition has been justified in each of the four theories' perspectives. First, agency theory argues that managers of high profit firms will disclose detailed information in order to win personal advantages and to justify the compensation package (Barako, 2007; Inchausti, 1997) . Second, stakeholders theory suggests that high profit firms will disclose more information to satisfy all stakeholders (Abdel-Fattah, 2008) . Third, from the political costs theory perspective, Inchausti (1997) argues that the management of profitable firms discloses more information in order to justify these higher profits. Fourth, signaling theory proposes that profitable firms will disclose more information in order to benefit from its success through raising the price and value of their shares (Inchausti, 1997; Foster, 1986) . In sum, achieving high profits is a main indicator of the management success. This will provide an incentive for the management to exploit this success in order to gain many benefits through the voluntary disclosure, such as strengthening its position, improving its reputation in the business market, and justifying compensation. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relation between profitability and voluntary disclosure
Firm Leverage
Despite the conflicting results on the relationship between firm leverage and voluntary disclosure, there are several reasons that justify a positive association. First, high leverage levels raise the agency costs, which encourage managers to disclose more information in order to reduce such costs (Alves et al., 2012) . Second, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that firms with high debt ratios are subject to high monitoring costs, and therefore, they disclose more information. Third, firms with high debt ratios tend to disclose more information voluntarily in order to reassure their lenders, and to prolong or extend the debt contract period. Fourth, firms committed to large debt contracts are often required to comply with certain debt restrictive covenants, and to show their compliance have to disclose more information than is required. Consequently, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relation between leverage and voluntary disclosure.
Independent Directors
The large ratio of independent directors to total board size confirms the independence of the board, and implies that monitoring results will be more effective as should conduct their monitoring tasks more effectively and should ask the management for greater disclosure to the stakeholders. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 5: There is a positive relation between the ratio of independent directors and voluntary disclosure.
Auditor Specialization
Auditor specialization is one of the least examined variables in the context of voluntary disclosure; therefore, this study contributes by its inclusion. Auditor specialization is one of the main audit quality determinants, since specialized auditors should provide high quality reassurance results, which, in turn, will affect the voluntary disclosure effectively. Furthermore, Peters et al. (2001) document that the literature concludes that auditor specialization is positively correlated with disclosure quality and transparency. In addition, Peters et al. (2001, p. 2) state, "Our evidence supports the view that specialized auditors are employed in order to reduce information asymmetry by lending credibility to firms' disclosure". Therefore, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 6: There is a positive relation between the auditor specialization and voluntary disclosure. Abdel-Fattah (2008, p.198) states, "It has been hypothesized that companies audited by an international big audit firm will disclose more information voluntarily". In addition, Abd-Elsalam (1999) argues that large audit firms work hard to protect their reputation, and they are more independent than small audit firms; therefore, they ask their clients to follow the mandatory disclosure rules, in addition to disclosing more information voluntarily. Moreover, the authors consider that since management hires the external auditors, if they hire one of the big-four, this reveals that the management is ready to disclose more information and there is no intention to conceal any information. Further, a firm audited by a big-four (Big 4) auditor implies that in the client acceptance phase the auditor has concluded, that the client is ready to disclose more information as the auditor requires. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
Auditor Type
Hypothesis 7: There is a positive relation between the auditor type and voluntary disclosure.
Family Ownership
The family ownership variable is not included in the current study randomly. First, we notice that only a few studies around the world address the family ownership variable in the context of voluntary disclosure, e.g., Ghazwy (2010) and Chau and Gray (2002) .
Second, the Saudi market is dominated by the family firms; the Saudi industrial and commercial champers council highlights that 95% of firms listed on Saudi Stock Exchange are family firms, and that of the 100 largest firms in the Kingdom 45 are family firms.
Practically, Ghazwy (2010) argues that the family ownership may influence positively the social voluntary disclosure; however, no relationship is concluded. However, this study argues that family firms may tend to disclose more information voluntarily, since these firms compete to gain a social position, create a prestige, and improve the image of their families. Consequently, we hypothesize that: However, we propose a positive influence for a number of reasons. First, we expect that governments will be on the stakeholders' side, since governments work for the public interest. Second, governments want to ensure compliance with corporate governance principles, such as the transparency. Third, there are certain specific issues that governments will require the companies' management to provide greater disclosure, such as the social and environmental impacts. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 9: There is a positive relation between state ownership and voluntary disclosure.
Industry Type
In general, the voluntary disclosure level is expected to differ in nature and extent across different sectors. For example, the Egyptian banks were found to have higher disclosure levels than firms in other sectors. Dahaway (2009) explains that banks, in general, are subject to additional disclosure requirements set by the central banks. In addition, due to the special nature of the financial industry, a considerable portion of disclosure is expected to be different in nature from other sectors. Furthermore, companies in harmful environmental sectors, such as the petroleum, chemical, and fertilizers industries, are expected to disclose voluntarily more information than companies in green sectors, such as the tourism sector. This is because the former companies are under pressure from society and environment protection bodies. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 10: There is a relation between the industry type and voluntary disclosure. Table 1 shows that our initial sample consists of 694 firm-year observations. We exclude 172 observations because they belong to the financial sector. Furthermore, we discarded another 161 observations with missing data. Consequently, the final sample consists of 361 firm-year observations. All firms are listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange, and the data was collected from the annual reports of the sample firms available at "www.tadawual.com.sa". Our sample period covers years 2007-2011 and, therefore, panel data are used. In this regard, Christodoulou and Sarafidis (2008) , among others, argue that panel data increase the estimation efficiency, since this data type increases the observations more than time-series data and cross-sectional data. 
Methodology
Sample
Content Analysis and the Disclosure Index
We employ content analysis to examine the nature and extent of voluntary disclosure for two reasons. First, content analysis is prevalent in the disclosure literature and the results of many studies have encouraged the researchers to use its methodology (Alves et al, 2012) . This is because of its reliability, validity, and the shortage of other means that can measure the disclosure extent effectively (Gray & Haslam, 1990) . Second, unlike other methods, such as questionnaires or field studies, this analysis evaluates the annual reports information without the knowledge of the information communicator, which makes it a discrete analysis (Alves et al. 2012 ). In addition, content analysis can be computerized or manual. The computerized content analysis can save cost and time, and may reduce the subjectivity. However, it requires the availability of annual reports in the same language and in English in most cases, which is not available in many countries (Abdel-Fattah, 2008) . Therefore, this study uses manual content analysis.
Furthermore, we built a self-constructed disclosure index, derived from the literature. The process of disclosure index construction in the majority of studies follows four steps. The first is preparing a checklist that consists of the voluntary disclosure items.
Therefore, we constructed a checklist consists of 54 information items classified under 10 different categories (See Appendix A). We developed this checklist based on pioneering studies in this field, including Botosan (1997) and Meek et al. (1995) . The second step is employing content analysis to analyze the actual information in the annual reports, and then compare them with the prepared checklist. The third step is scoring each firm for the number of disclosed and non-disclosed items; therefore, we adopt the Dischotomous procedure as it is a common evaluation method. We assign one for each firm-year observation if the item is disclosed and assign zero otherwise. The final step is calculating the disclosure index. Following Hodgdon (2004) and Cooke (1989) , among others, we measure the ratio of disclosure index as the actual score given to a firm to the maximum disclosure expected. For example, if a firm in a given year discloses 20 items, then its actual score is 20, and the disclosure ratio = 20/54, which is 0.37.
Model Specification
The following ordinary least square (OLS) regression model is employed to examine the study hypotheses: VDINDEXjt = γ 0 + γ1 LogAsstjt + γ2 LogAgejt + γ3 ROAjt + γ4 LEVRGjt + γ5 BrdIndpejt + γ6 Audspecjt+ γ7 Big4jt+ γ8 Famownjt+ γ9 Stateownjt+ γ10 Indjt+ ε 
LogAsstjt
Firm Size LogAsst is measured as natural logarithm of book value of total assets for the firm j and period t.
LogAgejt
Firm Age
Firm Age is expressed as the natural logarithm of years number since establishment, for the firm j and period t.
ROAjt
Firm Profitability
ROA refers to return on assets, and is measured as the ratio of net income to total assets for the firm j and period t.
LEVRGjt
Firm Leverage LEVRG is measured as long-term debts divided by capital equity.
BrdIndpejt
Independent Directors
BrdIndpe is the ratio of independent directors to total board size
Audspecjt
Auditor Specialization
Audspec is a dummy variable, which equals one if the auditor is specialized in the client industry, zero otherwise.
Big4jt
Auditor Type Big4 is a dummy variable, which equals one if the auditor is one of the Big4, zero otherwise.
Famownjt
Family Ownership
Famown is the ratio of shares owned by family members to total outstanding shares
Stateownjt
State ownership
Stateown is the ratio of shares owned by the state to total outstanding shares.
Indjt: stands for Industry Type and is divided into 5 sub-variables representing 5 different sectors:
Indptroenrg Petrochemical Sector Dummy variable, one if the firm belongs to the petrochemical sector, zero otherwise.
Indagr
Agriculture Sector
Dummy variable, one if the firm belongs to the agriculture sector, zero otherwise.
Indindstin-t Industrial Sector
Dummy variable, one if the firm belongs to industrial sector, zero otherwise.
Indrelstat
Real Estate Sector Dummy variable, one if the firm belongs to the real estate sector, zero otherwise.
Indtele
Telecommunication Sector
Dummy variable, one if the firm belongs to telecommunication sector, zero otherwise. Table 3 shows the descriptive analysis, however, only the noteworthy observations are discussed. First, the table shows that the mean of voluntary disclosure index is 18.38, which indicates that only 18.38%, on average of all the disclosure index items are actually disclosed by the sample firms. Second, Table 3 shows that the mean of leverage is 10.50%, which indicates that the sample firms are not highly leveraged firms, and do not suffer debt problems. In addition, a minimum value of zero and a maximum value of 62.10% reveal a large dispersion in firms' debt ratios. Third, the board independence mean is 52.50 %, which implies that about half of the sample firms' directors are independent. Fourth, the mean of auditor specialization is 39.80%, which indicates that specialized auditors, on average, audit about 40% of the sample firms. Fifth, the mean of Big4 variable is 0.637, which asserts that a Big4 auditor audits 63.70%, on average, of the sample firms. Sixth, the mean of family ownership variable is 0.15, which infers that families own about 15%, on average, of the sample firms. In addition, the minimum value of family ownership variables is zero, which indicates that ownership structure of some sample firms does not include family ownership. In contrast, the maximum value of family ownership variable is 0.95, which indicates that the ownership structure of some sample firms comprises of 95% family ownership. Finally, concerning the state ownership variable, its mean is 0.07, and its minimum and maximum values are zero and 0.830, respectively, which indicates that ownership structure rangers from 83% state ownership to zero state ownership. 
Study Results & Discussion
Descriptive Statistics
Comparison with other Arab Countries
In comparison with the voluntary disclosure magnitudes concluded by prior research on some Arab countries, Table 4 summarizes the rates from the current study and those of ten other studies across the Arab world. The table shows that the voluntary disclosure extent in this study is the lowest (18.38%), while the highest extent is in the study by Juhmani (2013) in a sample of Bahraini firms (75.76%). However, the variation in the voluntary disclosure level may be due to different studies' circumstances such as the study period, and the categories of voluntary disclosure included in the disclosure index, or may be because of differences in the accounting standards followed or the mandatory disclosure requirements among these countries. Table 5 shows the correlation analysis. It shows that the highest correlation between the independent variables is 50.70%; this is between the firm size and the Big4.
Correlation Matrix and Multicollinearity Analysis
The next highest correlation is 48%, between the auditor specialization and the Big4. There is no ee Multicollinearity problem, since Bryman and Cramer (2001) , among others, argue that the correlation between the independent variables is not harmful if it does not exceed 0.80 or 0.90, while others document that a correlation of less than 70% does not represent a correlation risk. Table 6 summarizes the results of OLS regression analysis. It is apparent that the Fvalue is 9.390 (P=0.000), which indicates that the study model is statistically significant.
Multiple Regression Results
Moreover, the adjusted value of the determination coefficient (Adj.R 2 ) = 0.445, which implies that the independent variables explain 45.50% of total variation in the voluntary disclosure index. In sum, the model is a statistically effective for explaining the variation in the extant of voluntary disclosure.
Regarding the independent variables' results, Table 6 shows that the firm size is positively and significantly correlated with the voluntary disclosure (significance level is 1%) which is consistent with the first hypothesis. This result is consistent with the results of Soliman (2013), Abdel-Fattah (2008) , Wang et al. (2008) , Alsaeed (2006) , Nasser et al. (2002), and Meek et al. (1995) . This result asserts that argument of the stakeholders'
theory that large firms are more likely to provide more voluntary disclosure, since these firms are under greater pressure from the large number of stakeholders following the large firms.
The table also shows that firm age is positively and statistically correlated with the voluntary disclosure (significance level is 10%). This finding confirms the argument that the older firms have the incentives, resources, and expertise to organize and disseminate more information than do younger firms. Moreover, this argument agrees with that of Soliman (2013) , and with the results of Hossain and Hammami (2009) .
Moreover, the analysis shows that firm profitability is positively correlated with the voluntary disclosure and statistically significant at 5%, which consistent with the third hypothesis. This result asserts the arguments of agency and political costs theories that managers of high profit firms will disclose more information to gain personal interests, such as creating a good reputation, and to justify the compensation package (Barako, 2007; Inchausti, 1997) . Further, the result asserts the signaling theory argument that profitable firms disclose more information to raise their price and value of their shares (Inchausti, 1997; Foster, 1986) . This result is consistent with Wang et al. (2008) and Samaha and Dahawy (2011) , among others, who argue that higher profits induce managers to supply more information to signal quality. Furthermore, the analysis shows that the firm leverage is negatively and significantly correlated with voluntary disclosure (significance level is 1%). This contradicts the agency theory argument that leveraged firms are more likely to disclose more information to reduce the increased agency costs created because of high debts (Alves et al. 2012) . This also contradicts the authors' expectations that highly leveraged firms are more likely to disclose more information voluntarily in order to reassure their lenders that business is stable, renew the existing debts, and signal that they are able to repay the debts whenever due.
We also find an insignificant negative correlation between independent directors' ratio and voluntary disclosure, which inconsistent with our fifth hypothesis that firms with high ratio of independent directors are more likely to disclose more information. This result contradicts that of Samaha and Dahawy (2011) who find a positive correlation. This result also is inconsistent with the agency theory argument that board independence is an effective corporate governance mechanism that could increase and improve the voluntary disclosure.
In terms of the quality of auditing environment, we find a positive and significant correlation between auditor specialization and voluntary disclosure (significance level is 10%). This result is consistent with the sixth hypothesis and the argument of Peters et al. (2001) that firms audited by specialized auditors improve the audit quality, which in turn, increases the level of voluntary disclosure. However, we find negative and insignificant correlation between auditor type and the voluntary disclosure. This result conflicts with arguments of Abdel-Fattah (2008) and Abd-Elsalam (1999) and the current study's hypothesis that firms audited by one of the Big4 auditors tend to disclose more information voluntarily, since a Big4 auditor attempts to guard its reputation and supports stakeholder through extra disclosure. However, this result is consistent with that of Soliman (2013), Dahawy (2011), and Alsaeed (2006) .
In terms of ownership structure, on one hand, we find a positive and significant correlation between family ownership and voluntary disclosure (significance level is 5%).
This result confirms the current study's argument that family firms tend to disclose more information, since the families wish to improve their families' image and position and to create prestige within the community. Although, Ghazwy (2010) proposed a positive correlation between the family ownership and voluntary disclosure extent, but his results did not confirm his expectation. On the other hand, we did not find significant correlation between state ownership and the voluntary disclosure extent. This result contradicts the study expectations, and those of Juhmani (2013) and Huafang and Jianguo (2007) that the state-controlled firms tend to disclose more information to show their compliance with corporate governance principles, such as transparency. However, this result is congruent with that of Samaha and Dahawy (2011) who find no significant correlation between state ownership and voluntary disclosure.
Finally, looking at the industry type, the results show that petrochemicals sector is positively correlated with voluntary disclosure, and statistically significant at 5%, and both the agriculture sector and telecommunication sector are positively correlated with the voluntary disclosure extent, and statistically significant at 1%. This positive correlation can be justified, since the activities of petroleum and agricultural firms are more likely to negatively influence society and the environment through the diffusion of polluting substances. In addition, telecommunication firms potentially affect society negatively through the harmful radiation; therefore, these firms tend to disclose more information, particularly social information, to reassure the population and social organizations that they comply with society and environment protection rules. However, the results show no significant correlation for firms in the industrial or real estate sectors.
In sum, the regression results provide evidence that firm size, firm age, firm profitability, auditor specialization, family ownership, and industry type affect positively voluntary disclosure. However, only firms' leverage was found to negatively affect voluntary disclosure, while no significant correlation was found between independent directors' ratio, auditor type, and state ownership and voluntary disclosure. Kolsi (2012) , to 75.76% in Bahrain by Juhmani (2013) . This low rate in Saudi Arabia is not commensurate with the size and influence of the Saudi Arabia economy. The results also provide evidence on the positive significant association between firm size, firm age, firm profitability, auditor specialization, family ownership, and industry type, and the voluntary disclosure extent. This result implies that these variables are the main voluntary disclosure drivers in Saudi Arabia. However, a negative significant association was found between firm leverage and voluntary disclosure, while no significant association was found between board independence, Big 4, and state ownership, and the voluntary disclosure extent.
Nevertheless, this study has a number of limitations. First, due to data availability, we limit our analysis to ten potential determinants of disclosure. Second, the firm-year observations examined are only 361 and the study period is only 5 years, which are small, relative to the size and age of the Saudi Capital Market.
Our study suggests a number of other avenues for future research. It would be interesting to study the tone of voluntary disclosure in annual reports and to explore the extent to which tone disclosure affects the stock market participants in emerging economies. In addition, Said Ressas and Hussainey (2014) provide evidence that financial crisis affect the tone of disclosure in annual reports. It might be interesting to examine the impact of financial crisis on the disclosure practice in emerging economies. Finally, it would be interesting to extend the present study by looking at the determinants of individual classes of information in emerging economies (i.e. forward-looking disclosure).This research idea has been extensively explored in developed economy (i.e. Abed et al, 2014) ; however, there has been little evidence on the determinants of individual classes of information in emerging economies. 
